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The ethics of designing has often been organised according 
to moral imperatives, and social design not only aligns with 
such moralities, but perpetuates them without providing a 
clear critique of the systems to which they adhere.  
To rid itself of such reactive ideologies, and so to create 
other conditions for the possibility of its creativity, social 
design might occupy itself with a different account of 
ethics altogether.  This paper will seek to elucidate such a 
different ethics along the lines Baruch Spinoza proposed 
and Gilles Deleuze championed. That is, it will therefore call 
for an affective designing that operates by creating ethical 
ontologies. This article will bring an affective, ethical, 
ontological design to bear on a social entity that emerges 
from the relations affectivity requires insofar as it is one 
that is designed.
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‘The use of philosophy is to maintain an active 
novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the 
social system.’
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 174.
Opening remarks
Recent times have seen the discourses around 
the social function, social responsibility, and 
social responsiveness of design and innovation 
flourish.1 For social design/innovation theorists 
and practitioners Lorraine Gamman and Adam 
Thorpe (2011b), for example, the designation 
responsiveness is preferred to responsibility, as 
for them it encompasses a more robust call to 
action in concert with the many stakeholders, 
shareholders, and other actors involved in any 
act of social design and innovation. While their 
overall mission seems valid and even laudable, 
it is the concept of responsiveness that I would like 
to focus on at the outset of this piece, in order 
to provide the germ – or, rather, the irritant –
from which this essay will emerge. With re-
sponsiveness, then, we have connotations of 
reaction, an action taken as an effect of some-
thing else happening, a response; active rather 
than passive, yes, but an act that places the 
stimulus for itself somewhere else. Gilles Deleuze 
begins the chapter of Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962) 
that deals with Friederich Nietzsche’s concepts of 
active and reactive forces, by discussing Baruch 
Spinoza’s conception of the body. I will return 
to Spinoza, Deleuze, and the body below, but 
the way in which Deleuze characterises active 
and reactive in these terms is helpful now. He 
writes: “In a body, the superior or dominant 
forces are called active and the inferior or do-
minated ones reactive. Active and reactive are 
precisely the original qualities that express the 
relationships between forces” (Deleuze, 1962, 45; 
my translation). More than 20 years after writing 
this, and in relation to the work of his friend 
Michel Foucault, Deleuze (1986) discusses the 
same kinds of relations between forces in terms 
of “power”, which is important now because I 
question socially responsive design’s responses 
to power. If the reactive stance is one that de-
termines, and is determined by, one’s position 
of inferiority in relation to power as Deleuze 
and Foucault both show, it leaves dubious a de-
sign that calls itself responsive while seeking 
to make positive social impact. While I may not 
necessarily deny the impetus that moves design 
away from activities of exploitation (e.g. Julier, 
2017) towards less parasitical acts in the name 
of the social, I wonder whether proponents of 
socially responsive design could articulate their 
activities in ways that do not demand, at worst, 
acceptance of, or at best, reaction to, dominating 
discourses of power and the imbalance of forces 
that power requires.2  In what follows, I will offer 
a way to think about social design that begins 
to reconstruct it in terms of active agents in af-
fective relations; that is not to react, but to set 
the conditions according to which social design 
action can take place.
As Deleuze recognises (1962 & 1986), any phi-
losophical intervention in concerns of power, 
agency, their relationships as networks, and 
the creative forces that combine to produce 
all of this, must be considered both ethically 
and ontologically. Both of which converge, es-
pecially in the work of Spinoza. In the article 
that follows, I will philosophically examine 
these concepts and bring them to bear upon the 
theories and practices that form social design. 
This examination will, therefore, present two 
main areas. First, it will deal with affect, as it 
is for rethinking ethics that Spinoza mobilises 
this concept. I note that this would, ideally, also 
encounter politics—the preceding mention of 
power highlights this perfectly. I will defer such 
an investigation to another time, for brevity’s 
sake, but ask that the ways in which such con-
nections might be made are not forgotten.3 
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Secondly, this piece will examine these concepts 
through a particular example: the Well-being of 
Future Generations Act (Wales) 2015, presented 
as an instance of social design. The lesson for 
social design in all this, is that an engagement 
with affective existence will offer new ways 
for creating ethical ontologies, in differently 
constituted social groups, not simply responding 
to hegemonies of power and control as they are 
currently constructed.
I have positioned this paper so far in terms of 
a critique of socially responsive design seen 
as reactive. Before I move on, it is worth high-
lighting the wealth of work engaging with ac-
tivist opportunities for and of design (e.g. Fuad-
Luke, 2009; Julier, 2013a & 2013b; Hroch, 2015) 
and in distinction to the reactive characteristic 
of socially responsive design innovation as 
discussed. Guy Julier notes, for example, the 
ways in which his concept of “design culture” 
(2013c) spawns the pragmatics of “design ac-
tivism,” not only as a response to the politics 
of neoliberalism, but also as design activism’s 
production is exacerbated by neoliberalism’s 
crises (Julier, 2013b). He highlights four themes of 
such a design activism, as follows: 
Intensification—which describes here a den-
sity of designerly intervention;  co-articulation –
which describes the marrying up of concerns or 
practices in a way that strengthens both; tem-
porality – which describes the way that speed, 
slowness, or even open-endedness may be dealt 
with; territorialization—which describes the scale 
through which responsibility is conceived. 
(Julier, 2013b, 227)
Julier’s themes here emphasise some interesting 
concepts, many of which resonate with some 
of my own work on philosophy, design, and in- 
novation (Brassett, 2013; 2015 & 2016), and others 
who draw upon some of the philosophers we 
will encounter below (see, for example: Grierson 
et al, 2015; O’Reilly, 2015; Marenko, 2015). While 
a more fulsome argument with these concepts 
will have to wait, I would like now to highlight 
Julier’s “temporality” and “territorialisation.” His 
focus is upon mapping ways in which design 
might practise as more resolutely activist, but the 
philosophically creative and pragmatic approach 
I will take here encounters similar concepts, and 
with similar urges. The creation of radical and 
oppositional temporalities will reappear below 
in terms of the speeds and slowness of a thing’s 
constituent particles, with ethical relations ex- 
pressing the values of the impacts they have on 
each other. Julier scales the spatiality inherent 
in considerations of speed and slowness, giving 
the resultant complex a strongly ethical flavour 
(with the term “responsibility”). Taken together, 
all four of Julier’s themes chart a space and time 
for a creative intervention that accesses modes 
of action across social, political, and ethical 
potentialities, that has as much to offer social 
innovation as it does design activism—as I hope 
to articulate in what follows. 
The section that follows will focus upon Spinoza’s 
concept of the body, especially in terms of affect; 
before examining the example of the ‘Well-being 
of Future Generations Act (Wales) 2015. The final 
section will draw out the ethical characteris-
tics that both he and Deleuze highlight therein, 
with attention to providing an initial sketch for 
a different, more ontologically inflected, and 
therefore affective and active, social design.
Affect and design 
Writing of the ways in which matter is endowed 
with its own energy, its own vibrancy, and which 
it uses to form itself, political scientist Jane 
Bennett (2010, xii) aligns herself with what she 
calls a “Spinozist notion of affect, which refers 
broadly to the capacity of any body for activi-
ty and responsiveness.” In one way, we can see 
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an alignment of Spinoza’s affective body with a 
concept of responsiveness, which has already 
been critiqued above. Maybe this will offer a pos-
sibility to agree with Gamman and Thorpe (2011b) 
that social responsiveness is “good enough?” But 
Bennett shows that responsiveness, a capacity 
for being affected and openness to the acts of 
others, is only part of the equation, and we might 
infer that to ignore “action” is certainly not good 
enough. 
While Bennett quotes from Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1988), it is in Spinoza’s 
work that she recognises the concept of affect 
to be grounded.4  Similarly, Gregory Siegworth 
and Melissa Gregg, in the introductory essay to 
their collection The Affect Theory Reader (Gregg 
and Siegworth, 2010, 3), describe as “one of the 
most oft-cited quotations concerning affect,” 
the following from Spinoza’s The Ethics (1996, 
71; IIP2): “no one has yet determined what the 
Body can do.” There is much in this quotation; 
hence its characteristic as “oft-cited.”  I have 
brought Spinoza’s account of the body into design 
discussions for some years (Brassett, 2006), and 
have done so because it provides an account of 
a spatially constituted entity (Brassett, 1991 & 
1994) that deviates from the norms of design, 
especially as these are defined according to the 
relation of form and function to each other.5 
We shall see that form and function become 
relegated in importance in Spinoza’s body, with 
important ramifications for design.
In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza Deleuze 
writes (1990, 218):
“Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions 
as equivalent: what is the structure ( fabrica) 
of a body? And: what can a body do? A body’s 
structure is the composition of its relations. What 
a body can do corresponds to the nature and 
limits of its capacity to be affected.”  
(Original emphases) 
This passage highlights two points from Spi-
noza’s definition of the body that interested 
Deleuze so much – its relational composition 
and its action – and does so in ways that seem 
to chime with a traditional understanding of de-
sign: constructedness and function. In the Ethics 
Spinoza writes (1996, 41; IIL1 & IIL2), “Bodies 
are distinguished from one another by reason 
of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and 
not by reason of substance”; and later, “A body 
which moves or is at rest must be determined to 
motion or rest by another body, which has also 
been determined to motion or rest by another, 
and that again by another, and so on, to infinity.” 
These will be the co-ordinates we will use in our 
encounter with Spinoza’s body.6 Deleuze explains 
this further (1988, 123), relating the first as 
kinetic, and second as dynamic (as we will see in 
a moment):
“Thus, the kinetic proposition tells us that a body 
is defined by relations of motion and rest, of 
slowness and speed between particles. That is, it 
is not defined by a form or by functions [. . .] One 
never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; 
one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or 
lays down rhythms.”
The body is not alone but multiple; made up of 
a multitude of particles that are accelerating, 
decelerating, constant, or at rest; with each of 
these particles making and breaking connections 
with other particles, other bodies. Without its 
elementary particles swerving and colliding, 
causing ricochets, accelerating and coming to a 
halt (Brassett & O’Reilly, 20), without all of this 
a body is nothing. It is neither the aim of all this 
commotion, nor is it contained in these things 
undergoing different processes. The body is more 
than the sum of these particles, and exceeds 
the local organisation into organs that coalesce 
throughout the body. The body’s organisation 
is multiple, multiply differentiated, and always 
excessive of any particular format it engenders 
Jamie Brassett
176  | C U B I C  J O U R N A L  .  Design Social
for itself. As such, the body, a body, bodies, are 
always in the middle of the fields of potential, 
which they both situate and create.7 The struc-
ture of a body, then, is kinetic, relational, and 
multiplicitous and so crossed by, and folded-over, 
with many other things, both organic and non-
organic, that it is often difficult to see where one 
thing begins and another ends (Bennett, 2010). 
Small design consultancies characterise this 
well. Often with no permanent members of staff 
save the founder, these operate within a cloud 
of part-time, freelance, or sessional workers 
that are able to connect to different client or-
ganisations and their particular needs/desires 
in an instant. Further, if their offer is particular 
or specific, they can provide services to other 
small or even medium-sized consultancies.8 
This type of ecosystem of creative practice 
blurs the boundaries between terms such as 
collaborator and competitor, or inside and outside, 
in ways that exemplify the types of complex 
or chaotic organisation that are championed 
by management scholars Haridimos Tsoukas 
and Robert Chia (see: Tsoukas, 1998; Chia, 1999; 
Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).9
Which brings us to the “dynamic” proposition. 
Deleuze explains (1988, 123):
“The second proposition concerning bodies refers 
us to the capacity for affecting or being affected. 
You will not define a body (or mind) by its form, 
nor by its organs or functions, and neither will 
you define it as a substance or a subject.”
The determination of the “affective capacity” of 
a body comes from the disruption of its ordinary 
connections within social, scientific, natural, and 
cultural schema and allow many different prop-
erties to be re-connected in other creative ways. 
It is dynamic because it is kinetic. If the body’s 
elements are multiple and moving at different 
rates, and these are colliding and ricocheting in 
different directions, then the forces that these 
swerves and collisions express are the affective 
capacities. This has important consequences for 
design, reliant – as it has been for the last 100 
years or so – on being defined in accordance 
with the relative importance of form and func-
tion. While it is difficult for design companies, 
or sections of companies, to divorce themselves 
from the discourses of form and function, there 
are some for whom the network in which they 
operate – and so the relative impacts upon each 
element in the network – is important.10 Crucial 
to an affective, dynamic approach to designing 
is, for example: a desire not to control situations; 
and, to be open to ideas coming from outside that 
might challenge one’s beliefs (see also: Brassett & 
O’Reilly, 2018).
If bodies are kinetically described—if we take 
account the speeds and slowness of the rhythms 
of their connections to other bodies and things—
then they cannot help but affect other bodies. The 
critique of power relations that a consideration 
of affective capacities necessitates, leads to the 
realisation that any set of relationships can be 
articulated differently, even if they are between 
the same things in the same space at different 
times, or the same things across different spaces 
at the same time. This is one of the attributes 
for this way of thinking that Bennett (2010), for 
example, finds positively influential as a po-
litical scientist. An ethics of bodies in affective 
relationships – that do not necessarily only ex-
press themselves according to identity, form or 
function – provides a dynamic approach to the 
complexity of the world that is, in her words, 
“both vibrant and materially active.”
This points also to an utterly complex view of 
designing. If bodies are to be reconstructed ac-
cording to the speeds and slowness of their 
particles and the ways in which they affect each 
other, and not in relation to form, function, and 
substance, then this should impact all bodies in 
space; especially designed ones, ones that have 
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depended upon notions of form, function, and 
material to ground both their own ontologies, 
and the power over those entangled in such on-
tologies. 
An Example from Wales
The Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 
2015 is a law that requires Welsh public bodies to 
consider the “long term [impacts] of the decisions 
we make” (Welsh Government, 2015, 4).11 With 
a long-term foresight that is often lacking in 
politics, this act provides a statutory basis for 
taking into account the living standards of future 
generations in any public sector action; an act 
that environmental law expert Haydn Davis 
(2016, 41) regards as a “ground-breaking piece of 
legislation creating legal responsibilities which 
fall on the current generation, to safeguard the 
interests of future generations.” 12 Davis explains 
further (2016, 43):
“The fundamental idea is that all these bodies 
should ‘carry out sustainable development’ 
through the medium of well-being objectives de-
signed to achieve centrally defined well-being 
goals for the whole of Wales. These objectives 
must be set by the bodies themselves and all 
reasonable steps must be taken to meet them.” 
Encompassing seven “well-being” goals – com-
munity cohesiveness, global responsibility, 
prosperity, resilience, health, equality, and cul-
tural vibrancy (Welsh Government, 2015) – this 
act brings under one rubric agendas that often 
are dealt with separtely, and if they are brought 
together it is in terms of sustainable development 
only. This act takes sustainable development 
further in its ontological positioning of future 
well-being now, rather than the projected future 
state of current states of being. It is important 
to add that Davis (2016, 44–50) emphasises that 
though the act does not require the achievement of 
specific well-being objectives, any of the public 
bodies regulated by the act should be able to 
show that they have taken reasonable measures 
to account for the well-being of future generations 
in any of their processes. Davis’s focus is the legal 
status of this, which is important, of course; for 
us, we will focus upon the ontological concerns.13 
And while this act places as a core concern the 
ontologies of future residents of Wales, it does 
this in terms of the ethical responsibilities that 
current residents have towards them.14 There is 
a sense here, that any account of a contemporary 
social – and its sustainable development; that is, 
to ensure its future resilience – must include an 
encounter with ontology and ethics.
In “Control and Becoming” (1995, 171) De-
leuze reflects upon his and Félix Guattari’s cha-
racterisation of society in A Thousand Plateaus 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988) thus: “society is 
defined not so much by its contradictions as 
by its lines of flight, it flees all over the place.” 
We have seen particles of different speeds and 
slowness appear in Spinoza’s account of bo-
dies. With Deleuze, these speeds and slowness 
lead to highly kinetic social forms. The Well-
being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 
presents us with “particles” under a variety of 
speeds and slowness – from national museums 
to fire engines, health systems to public sector 
workers – in a set of ever changing, networked 
relationships. Without prescribing exactly what 
should be done across these very different bodies 
(it is clear that the roles, needs, and desires of 
emergency services are very different to those 
of art galleries, for example) the act provides the 
requirement for each, in its own milieu, to take 
into account the well being of future generations.
Spinoza’s other angle on bodies – that they are 
characterised by their affective capacities – ex-
presses the stuff of society as both dynamic 
and mutually impactful; which for Deleuze 
and Spinoza reinforces their ethical nature. As 
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we saw above, the recognition that a body 
is composed of particles at different speeds 
and slowness, is one that highlights their re-
lationalities and the pressures upon each other 
through these relations. At the surface of the 
Welsh example, the very notion of “well-being” 
is one that is deeply imbued with ethical (“well”) 
and ontological (“being”) concerns. With greater 
inspection, we can see different ethical ontologies 
being created. First and foremost, there is the 
affective connection between present actions 
and future lives, such that the ways of being 
that might be designed now (through addressing 
health services, for example, or reconstructing 
possible relations with cultural entities such 
as museums and galleries) must be considered 
in relation to future lives (through addressing 
health services, for example, or reconstructing 
possible relations with cultural entities such as 
museums and galleries). Next, there is the much 
more complex consideration that there is a future 
pressure upon the present, as noted especially 
in the work of Alfred North Whitehead (1961 & 
1978), and discussed by Brian Massumi (2011; 
see also: De Boever et al., 2012). There is a sense 
that the affective relationship of the future to 
the present, reinforced through this act, provides 
what Massumi (2011; De Boever et al., 2012) re- 
gards as a future cause for present actions. 
What this act of the Welsh parliament does is to 
require the affective capacities of any present 
socius (along with the interconnected particles 
that constitute aspects of its ontologies at various 
scales) to be constituted by their plausible future 
scenarios (Ramírez & Selin, 2014). 
There is a sense in which much design practice 
(not only social design) works in this way. With 
investigations at stages of the design process, 
particularly early research stages, working deep 
within the socio-cultural milieus of users, con-
sumers, customers and so on (i.e., Laurel, 2003; 
Brassett & Booth, 2008; Julier, 2013c; Brassett 
& O’Reilly, 2018; and many others on user-cen-
tredness in design), most often intended design 
outcomes are projected to futures generated 
from these milieus.15 We might see this design 
research, and the development undertakings that 
ensue from them, (or others such as projections 
about the value of specific design outcomes 
upon the future commercial success for a client 
company) as similar future causes. However, 
these more everyday occurrences in design 
practice do not overtly articulate themselves in 
ontological or ethical terms as general practice.
Lastly, in relation to the Welsh act, there is no 
beginning set by parameters of this act, as many 
of the institutions constituting its elements have 
been on their own social, cultural, political and 
historical journeys for some while. Neither is there 
a clearly definable end, insofar as “the future” 
is not precise and the ontological possibilities 
denoted by each of the “well-being goals” is already 
in motion and operate at different scales. The 
social and personal ontologies designed by this act, 
for both the present and the future, become less 
about particular ways of being (as the title of the 
act might suggest), and more about opportunities 
for becoming. That is, ways in which the potentials 
for having active existences are never exhausted 
in the systems, milieus, or processes in which they 
are activated.16 To do this without totalising and 
restricting, by constantly and creatively validating 
the “particles” becoming external (in both space 
and time), is some feat. And while the scrutiny 
and accountability issues encompassed by the act, 
as it is currently expressed, are somewhat vague, 
even problematic (Davis, 2016), the creative con-
struction of future-oriented ethical ontologies are 
astonishing, to say the least.  
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Final Remarks 
Design theorist Betti Marenko (2010, 136), in a 
piece called “Contagious Affectivity—the ma-
nagement of emotions in late-Capitalist design,” 
writes that “all design has to do with intensities 
and affects circulating among the stakeholders: 
objects, designers, users, as well as contexts” 
[original emphasis]. With this we re-encounter 
the forces of design activism and reaction noted 
at the outset of this article, realising that the 
ethical and ontological forces announced by the 
coming together of these discussions are also 
political and economic ones. For Marenko it is 
as important for designers to remember that 
capitalism accesses and profits from the affective 
capacities of designer bodies, as the fact of design 
affectivity itself. A “positive” affective perspective 
versus a “negative” capitalist one is not Marenko’s 
argument; neither is it that of the current article. 
Rather, for us now, it is that when a social design 
is being created it would be better to move away 
from a reactive, resentful urge, which still fails to 
challenge the hegemonies of capitalist machine, 
and engage instead in an active disruption of the 
very intensities and affective capacities upon 
which such a machine operates.17 These creative 
conditions that generate novel possibilities for 
existence are not only ontological and spatial but 
ethological too. That is, designing novel modes 
of social relations not only creates the ontologies 
that emerge (of the individual as well as of the 
social, and any points in-between and beyond 
these) but the affective power, the ethics, of 
the relations themselves. This is highlighted 
by philosopher of science, Isabelle Stengers, 
(2011, 325–326) in her “free and wild” conceptual 
“adventure” with the work of Whitehead, where 
she writes:
“Far from constituting a ‘defining characteristic’, 
my feeling of being ‘me’, continuously, in a he-
terogeneous world in which my attention never 
ceases to vary, which the mutations of my in-
terests, the permanent transformations of the 
‘here’ of my perception, never cease to recom-
pose, is thus in itself an ‘exploit’ requiring that 
the ‘chains of reiteration of the past’ be constantly 
forged, tinkered with, and improvised.”
For Stengers, the act of making us us, of giving us 
a sense of continuity in flux, over changing, he-
terogeneous times and spaces, is an act of design, 
even though she does not call it such. Life is an 
“exploit” of “transformation”, “recomposition”, va- 
riance and “mutation”, “constantly forged, tin-
kered with, and improvised.” We are in a constant 
process of being designed. As such, when the 
affective capacities of these creative networks of 
modes of existence are accounted for, then these 
acts become characterised as both social and 
ethical. Any work that seeks to design, redesign, 
disrupt or even respond to the social and political 
will, as a matter of fact, engage these ontologi- 
cal and ethical considerations.
Once designing – again all, not simply that 
which articulates itself as social – recognises 
its character as affective, then it should rea-
lise that these ontologies operate at different 
scales throughout such multiplicitous planes, 
as we have seen with the Welsh example. This 
approach does not privilege one particular 
existence over another. Collections of things, 
people, societies, powers, and processes are 
still affective and assembled, modal and exis-
tential, and ethical. A social design, then, is one 
that maps and mobilises the affective ontolo-
gies of its constituents and itself, deliberately and 
actively. It is one that recognises it is deploying 
ethical and ontological powers, and that by 
so doing it reinforces or disavows the various 
agential possibilities of the types of existence 
that emerge. This is not a reactive choice, but an 
important, active, and at the same time deeply 
committed one, which should have ramifications 
for all types of creative practice. This is an ap-
proach that is developing a strong account in 
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organisation studies largely, but not only, on 
the work of Tsoukas and Chia (see: Tsoukas, 
1998; Chia, 1999; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; and also, 
Hernes, 2014). It would be worthwhile to carry 
this into design in all its guises, and this current 
article hopes to make a start in this direction.
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Ezio Manzini and Anna Meroni (2007)—finding that it ‘still 
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hegemonic unsustainability’ (Kiem, 2011, p. 211).
3.    The current essay has a companion piece which is still 
in progress, ‘Creating Modes of Existence. Towards an 
Ethological Design’ that focuses upon the work of Gilbert 
Simondon (1989; 2005 & 2009), while examining the 
collision of ontology and ethics; and another, Brassett 
(2017). Another piece on ontology and politics of smart 
design, Foucault and Agamben is in progress too.
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become legend in design.
6.    I examine these same co-ordinates in another article on 
philosophy and design, with focus on speculation and 
technology (Brassett, 2016).
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Guattari, Canguilhem (2001) and illustration.
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16.  My article, see fn. 3 above, that focuses upon the work of 
Simondon (1989, 2005 & 2009) in relation to ethics, affect 
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foregrounding of the political concerns announced here: 
Agamben (2009); Bennett (2010); Connolly (2011, 2013). 
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